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Canada’s Evolving Tax Treaty Policy Toward Low-Income Countries
Kim Brooks 1
The Importance of Tax Treaty Design for Low-Income Countries
International trade and international flows of investment have mushroomed, and an
extraordinary amount of the world’s goods and services and annual investment capital
flows cross international borders. The tax treatment of almost all of the income that
results from these cross-border transactions is affected by tax treaties. Well over 2,000
bilateral tax treaties are now in force between the countries of the world. Canada alone
has almost 100 tax treaties in force. Tax treaties have thus become a major interest to
legislators, tax practitioners, and tax scholars and writing about them has become a
cottage industry in large segments of the international tax community. As one indication
of the interest they have generated, massive books are now being written about each
article in these treaties; for example, a 415 page book has been published about Article 13
of OECD Model Convention, which deals with the taxation of capital gains and which is
less than 20 lines of print long in the model treaty. 2
In part because they are so important, like substantive tax law itself, examining the design
of the tax treaties a country enters into should tell us a good deal about the balance of
interest group power in that country, the prevailing ideas, the ambitions of its politicians,
the institutions of government, and the other variables that might influence public policy
making in the country. Although the policy of tax treaties is thus multi-faceted and
complex, this paper takes only one aspect of that larger picture and examines it in some
detail; namely, Canada’s evolving tax treaty policy toward low-income countries.
This small slice of tax treaty policy is examined in this chapter for two reasons. First,
this aspect of tax treaty policy is important in its own right. The revenue that low-income
countries are able to raise from the income earned in their countries on cross border trade
and investment flows is often significant and is critical for the development of their
economy and for raising the standard of living of their impoverished residents. Second,
and just as importantly for the purposes of a collection paying tribute to Alexander
Easson, it was a subject that greatly interested Alex. Throughout much of his career he
acted as a tax advisor to the governments of low-income countries and he was keenly
aware of the importance of the design of tax treaties for them.
It is commonly asserted that the purpose of income tax treaties is to facilitate
international trade and investment by providing for the avoidance of double taxation
where two countries seek to tax the same income, by avoiding excessive taxation at
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source, by prohibiting a country from discriminating against a business owned by
residents of the other country, and by providing an efficient mechanism for resolving
disputes that might arise between tax administrators over the interpretation of the treaty. 3
However, although this is the generally advanced objective of tax treaties, it is well
known that in most treaties this objective is achieved in part by effectively reducing the
tax base of the source country (usually the low-income country) and thus increasing the
tax take of the residence country (usually the high-income country). 4 This is done
primarily, first, by reducing the scope for the source taxation of business income through
the definition of a permanent establishment as a requirement for source taxation, and
second, by reducing the withholding tax rate on passive income earned in the source
country. Some cynics have suggested that transferring revenues from low-income to
high-income countries has not been an unintentional side effect of treaties but rather has
been an unstated goal. 5
The story of the development of modern tax treaties is a familiar one and will not be
repeated here except to note that in large part the extent to which a country’s tax treaty
policy favours low-income countries or not depends upon the extent to which the country
is prepared to adopt provisions from the UN model treaty as opposed to the OECD model
treaty. 6 In 1963, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
published a draft model tax treaty (that was not published in an official version until
1977). That model treaty, drafted by representatives of the major western industrialized
countries, has gone through a number of minor iterations and is the one upon which
almost all tax treaties are based. Concerned that it resulted in too large a reduction in
source country tax, in 1980 an expert group assembled by the United Nations published
the alternative UN model treaty. Although it is based upon the OECD model, the UN
model retains much greater source country taxation. When negotiating with low-income
countries, many countries are prepared to adopt some provisions from the UN model and
the extent to which they are is some indication of their concern that low-income countries
be able to retain their tax base in cross-border transactions.
In examining Canada’s evolving tax treaty policy towards low-income countries, this
essay proceeds as follows. In 1988, Alex Easson published a paper that he had written
for a conference, “The Royal Commission on Taxation: 20 Years Later” that was
descriptively titled, “The Evolution of Canada’s Tax Treaty Policy Since the Royal
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Commission on Taxation.” 7 The article exemplifies much of Easson’s work: it is well
written, logically organized, and brings clarity to a broad area of tax law and policy; it
provides a strong analytical foundation for the developments in tax treaty policy; it
contains a good deal of pragmatism in its prescriptions; and, it reflects Easson’s
enthusiasm for design questions in tax treaties with low-income countries. Thus, to
provide a baseline for examining the recent evolution of Canada’s tax treaty policy, the
following section provides an overview of Easson’s article. In effect, he states the policy
as of 1988.
The next part of the chapter examines three aspects of Canada’s tax treaties entered into
since 1988 that might increase the scope for source-based taxation. First, the important
ways in which the scope for expanding the source taxation of business income in treaties
is examined: for example, by lowing the threshold for taxation of business profits,
expanding the scope of what profit should be allocated to an enterprise, allowing the
taxation of technical or management fees with minimal connection to the source state,
and permitting the taxation of gains on the alienation of real property. Second, those
treaty provisions that limit the withholding tax rates on passive investment income earned
in the source country, including the withholding tax rates on payments of interest,
dividends, and royalties, are reviewed. Third, the accommodations that Canada has made
since 1988 through tax sparing provisions for tax incentives enacted in low-income
countries are noted.
The final part of the paper briefly reviews the major changes to the Canada-U.S. income
tax convention proposed in the fifth protocol, signed on September 21, 2007, and raises
the implications for Canada’s tax treaty policy toward low-income countries.
Alex Easson’s Assessment of Canada’s Tax Treaty Policies up to 1988
Although not focused only on Canada’s tax treaty policy with low-income countries,
Easson nevertheless devotes a significant portion of his article to Canada’s tax treaties
with developing countries and his observations more generally have particular
applications for low-income country negotiations. The article sets out the history of
Canada’s tax treaty policy prior to Canada’s Royal Commission on Taxation (the Carter
Commission), which reported in 1966. He highlights the limited number of treaties
Canada had negotiated and attempts to explain why Canada negotiated so few treaties
around the time of the Carter Commission and immediately following it. He then
provides an overview of changes to the domestic Canadian tax system that would have
influenced Canada’s tax treaty negotiations in the period following the release of the
Carter Commission report. A country’s domestic tax design inevitably influences its tax
treaty negotiating position. For example, on the one hand, a low-income country that
defines income for tax purposes broadly in its domestic legislation and that wishes to
raise revenue from non-resident investors in the country will undoubtedly seek to ensure
that its tax treaties do not detract significantly from its ability to collect taxes on income
with a source in its jurisdiction. On the other hand, low-income countries that provide
7

Alexander J. Easson, ‘The Evolution of Canada’s Tax Treaty Policy Since the Royal Commission on
Taxation,’ Osgoode Hall Law Journal 26 (1988): 495.

4
generous exemptions from taxation for non-residents in their domestic legislation in the
hope of attracting additional investment will try to use their tax treaties to secure
protection for their tax incentives.
In his 1988 piece, Easson reviews four major changes to Canada’s domestic tax regime
following the release of the Carter Commission report, each of which would have had an
impact on Canada’s tax treaty negotiating position with low-income countries. First, he
discusses the introduction of foreign affiliate rules, rules designed to tax the income of
Canadian residents earned by investing in foreign corporations, which allowed Canadian
corporations to receive dividends free from Canadian tax if the foreign corporation was
resident in a country with which Canada had a tax treaty. These rules would have created
an incentive for low-income countries to enter into tax treaties with Canada. If, for
example, a low-income country offered either a low- or no-tax regime for business
activities as a means of attracting foreign investment, that tax incentive would be
preserved under these rules. The design of Canada’s foreign affiliate rules ensured that
active business income earned through a foreign affiliate could be repatriated to Canada
without any additional Canadian tax.
Second, the increase in the statutory withholding tax rate on cross-border investment
income from 15 to 25 percent also created an incentive for low-income countries to enter
into tax treaties with Canada. If a low-income country wanted to collect additional
revenue from withholding, it might be able to convince Canada to agree to a withholding
tax rate higher than 15 percent. In the alternative, if the low-income country wanted a
low withholding tax rate to encourage some forms of investment, it would need to enter
into treaty negotiations with Canada to achieve a lower withholding tax rate in return.
Third, Easson discusses the introduction of a capital gains tax in Canada in the years
following the release of the Carter Commission report, which required a change in
Canada’s tax treaty position to one that sought to preserve the source jurisdiction’s ability
to tax capital gains. This change to Canada’s domestic tax rules would have been useful
where the low-income country wanted to advocate for broad taxing scope for some
capital investment, for example, in natural resources.
Finally, the enhancement of Canada’s dividend tax credit, which allowed Canadian
resident shareholders to partially offset underlying corporate tax paid on corporate
distributions might have created additional bargaining power for all countries, including
low-income countries. Canada has always refused to extend its dividend tax credit to
non-resident investors, and as a consequence it has been pressed to give other
concessions to its treaty partners.
Although the domestic tax systems of the treaty partners informs many of the discussions
about the way a tax treaty between them can be used to integrate the two countries’
systems, the form of the tax treaty itself, without question, is driven by the tax treaty
designed and promoted by the OECD. At the time Easson published his article, the 1977
model treaty was the most recent version of the OECD model. Easson noted some of
Canada’s reservations to the OECD model treaty, including its reservations on
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withholding tax rates (Canada reserved the right to impose a higher rate of withholding
tax than that proposed by the OECD model), capital gains (Canada reserved the right to
tax a wider range of dispositions than the OECD model suggested), and pension income
(Canada reserved the right to tax pension income at source). Canada continues to reserve
on several articles of the current OECD model treaty. It has added a reservation that
enables Canada to tax income from the alienation of real property (not just income from
the real property). However, Canada has removed its reservations on the withholding tax
rates that apply to dividends, interest, and royalties, and has removed its reservations on
capital gains and pensions.
Despite Canada’s long-standing membership in the OECD, and its general adherence to
the OECD model tax treaty, since the Carter Commission report in particular Canada has
recognized that it has a role to play in ameliorating the capital-exporting bias of the
OECD tax treaty in its tax treaties with low-income countries. Therefore, in addition to
continuing to register reservations on the OECD model treaty, Canada will often
negotiate tax treaties with low-income countries that follow parts of the UN model tax
treaty. As mentioned above, that tax treaty was originally released in 1980. Although it
follows the OECD model closely, in some regards it allows greater source taxation,
therefore (relative to the OECD model) providing some additional taxing jurisdiction to
capital importing countries.
Generally speaking, as recounted by Easson, entering into tax treaties with low-income
countries requires three kinds of changes to the standard tax treaty Canada enters into
with capital exporting (high-income) countries. First, tax treaties with low income
countries often reflect an enlargement of the source taxation of business income. Second,
they increase the amount of tax that the source country is permitted to claim by
withholding from passive investment income (relative to the source taxation permitted
under the standard OECD model treaty). Third, they often include tax sparing provisions
that preserve the capital importing country’s tax incentives.
Easson reviews Canada’s concessions to low-income countries on each of these bases. In
terms of enlarged source country taxation, Canada’s treaties in this period revealed a
willingness to expand the definition of permanent establishment (the threshold for
business taxation), and to increase the rate of withholding tax for passive income. He
also notes that although prior to the Carter Commission report Canada had not granted
any tax sparing provisions (provisions that preserve the specific tax incentives offered by
low-income countries), after the release of that report Canada was willing to enter into
tax sparing provisions with a number of low-income countries.
The next part of this chapter reviews Canada’s tax treaty policy, particularly as it applies
to middle- and low-income countries from the post-1988 period, building on Easson’s
observations of Canada’s willingness to lower the threshold for source taxation, increase
the rates of withholding tax, and protect tax incentives where its treaty partner is a lowincome country.
Canada’s Tax Treaty Policy toward Low-Income Countries: 1988 – 2008

6

The last twenty years have seen the continued expansion of Canada’s tax treaty network.
Between 1988 and June 2008, Canada signed and has brought into force 53
comprehensive tax treaties. 8 These treaties have broadened the global reach of Canada’s
tax treaties significantly. Six were signed with countries in Africa, 13 with countries in
Asia, 26 with countries in Europe, five with countries in South America, and three with
North American countries. As Easson predicted, Canada expanded its reach to include
more former socialist countries, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Croatia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, and Uzbekistan.
To try to convey a sense of Canada’s policy towards low-income countries since 1988,
the countries with which Canada has entered into treaties over this period are divided into
three categories: high-income, middle-income, and low-income. A country is classified
as high-income if it had GDP per capita in excess of $20,000 per year (US, PPP, 2005);
middle-income if it had GDP per capita between $10,000 and 19,999 per year; and lowincome if it had GDP per capita of less than $10,000 per year. 9 By this standard, of the
53 tax treaties signed and brought into force in this twenty-year period, 15 were with
high-income countries, 17 were with middle-income countries, and 21 were with lowincome countries.
All 53 treaties were examined to determine the extent to which they expanded (or not) the
scope for the source taxation of business income, the policy they reflect on withholding
tax rates on passive investment income, and their use of tax sparing provisions. The
results are described below. To spare the reader copious footnoting, and since these
provisions are numbered the same in almost every treaty, treaty articles have not been
footnoted. 10
Expanding the Scope for Source Taxation of Business Income
Lowering the Threshold for a “Permanent Establishment”
Easson noted that prior to 1988 Canada was willing to negotiate tax treaties with lowincome countries that lowered the threshold of activity required before a non-resident
would be subject to tax in a low-income country on its business activities in that country.
At least in theory, a country could decide to tax the profits earned by a non-resident
enterprise simply because that enterprise sells goods and services in the country.
However, no country has managed to conclude a tax treaty that sets the threshold for
taxation of business income that low, although when a group of experts met under the
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auspices of the United Nations to draft the UN model convention they contemplated the
possibility of such an approach. 11
Both the OECD model convention and the UN model employ the permanent
establishment concept to delineate the degree of contact a non-resident enterprise
carrying on business in a jurisdiction requires before it is subject to tax there. The OECD
model tax treaty standard definition of a permanent establishment is based primarily on
the idea of some physical presence and includes a place of management, a branch, an
office, a factory, a workshop, and a mine, an oil or gas well, a quarry or other place of
extraction of natural resources, and a building site or construction or installation project
that lasts more than twelve months.
The OECD model tax treaty also provides for some exclusions from the definition of
permanent establishment. These exclusions are generally designed to remove from the
scope of source-based taxation the use of facilities simply for storage or delivery, the
maintenance of a stock of goods without more, the maintenance of a fixed place simply
for purchasing goods, and the maintenance of a fixed place solely for a preparatory or
auxiliary reason. In essence, these exclusions remove casual or temporary business
activities from the scope of source-based taxation.
The UN model convention departs from the OECD model’s definition largely by
broadening the definition of activities that might be sufficient for an enterprise to be
found to have a permanent establishment. Six of the major departures, and the extent to
which Canada has followed them in its treaties with low-income countries, are reviewed
here. First, the UN model convention reduces the amount of time required for a building
site or construction or assembly project to exist to be considered a permanent
establishment. Engaging in a construction or assembly project in a country would
generally be considered to be ‘carrying on business’ in a country and therefore under
many country’s domestic tax systems (including Canada’s) the enterprise would be
subject to tax. According to the OECD model convention, such a project will be
considered to be a permanent establishment only if it exists for more than twelve months.
Under the UN model convention, such a project may be a permanent establishment if it
exists for six months. Canada is more likely to grant a lower time period before a
building site, construction or assembly project may be a permanent establishment where
the treaty partner is a low-income country. In negotiating with its high-income treaty
partners, Canada has agreed to the standard OECD term of 12 months with 13 of them,
and a shorter term of six months with only two. In its negotiations with middle-income
countries, Canada agreed to a term of 12 months in seven treaties, six months in nine
treaties, and three months in one treaty. In its treaties with low income countries, Canada
agreed to the OECD period in only seven treaties, reducing the time to nine months in
one treaty (Armenia), six months in ten treaties (Bulgaria, Ecuador, India, Jordan,
Mongolia, Peru, Tanzania, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zimbabwe), three months in two treaties
(Algeria, Nigeria), and in its treaty with Senegal no time period is required. It is clear,
then, that Canada is much more likely to grant shorter periods in this part of the
11

Stanley S. Surrey, ‘United Nations Group of Experts and the Guidelines for Tax Treaties Between
Developed and Developing Countries,’ Harvard International Law Journal 19 (1978): 1 at 11.

8
permanent establishment article if the country is a middle- or low-income country than it
is to deviate from the OECD-suggested period of time for high-income countries.
Second, the UN Model convention expands the definition of permanent establishment to
include the general furnishing of services, including consultancy services, by an
enterprise through employees or other personnel where the activities continue for the
same or a connected project within the country for more than six months, or a lesser
period, within any twelve month period. Under the OECD model such activities alone
would not necessarily constitute a permanent establishment. The rationale for this
expansion of the permanent establishment concept in the UN treaty was that such
services were analogous to building site or other construction project activities. 12 Canada
has been willing to include this services provision in its tax treaties where the treaty
partner is a middle- or low-income country. In contrast to its treaties with high-income
countries (only two of which include the services provision), Canada agreed to add this
provision in eight of its treaties with middle-income countries and in 12 of its treaties
with low-income countries (Algeria, Armenia, Ecuador, India, Jordan, Kazakhstan,
Mongolia, Peru, Senegal, Tanzania, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe). Generally speaking, the
period of time before the services may constitute a permanent establishment ranges from
3 months (two treaties) to twelve months (two treaties). The treaty with Jordan does not
include a time period before the services will be held to be a permanent establishment if
the services are related to the exploitation of natural resources.
Third, the OECD model treaty lists six circumstances in which even though the enterprise
has a fixed place of business, it is not a permanent establishment since the activities are
preparatory or ancillary in nature; the UN model eliminates the ‘delivery of goods’ from
this exclusion list. Under the OECD model, if an enterprise simply uses facilities for the
delivery of goods or maintains a stock of goods in that jurisdiction for delivery, that
activity alone is not sufficient to constitute a permanent establishment. Under the UN
model convention, the delivery of goods exclusion is not listed as an exception to the
permanent establishment definition. It has been relatively unusual for Canada to agree to
remove the mere delivery of goods or merchandise from the rule that deems such
activities not to be a permanent establishment. However, it has followed this UNproposed change in one treaty with a middle-income country (Oman), and with six lowincome countries (Algeria, Armenia, India, Senegal, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe).
As an alternative to setting up an office or other fixed place of business, an enterprise
may conduct business in a country by sending an agent to act on its behalf. Whether or
not that agent constitutes a permanent establishment depends largely on the degree of
independence of the agent. As a fourth change to the OECD definition of permanent
establishment, the UN model convention expands the concept of a dependent agent.
Under the OECD model convention, if an enterprise has a dependent agent who is able to
12
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habitually exercise the authority to conclude contracts in the name of the enterprise, that
agent will constitute a permanent establishment. Under the UN model convention, a
dependent agent is an agent who either (1) concludes contracts on behalf of the
developing country enterprise or (2) has no authority to conclude contracts, but who
regularly delivers goods or merchandise on behalf of the enterprise. In other words, the
UN model convention expands the definition of permanent establishment by including an
agent who habitually maintains in the state a stock of goods or merchandise from which
he or she regularly delivers goods or merchandise on behalf of the enterprise. For highand middle-income countries, Canada has been unlikely to include language similar to
that suggested by the UN that expands the circumstances in which a dependent agent will
be deemed to be a permanent establishment. One tax treaty with a high-income country
(Kuwait), 13 and two with middle income countries (Lithuania and Trinidad and Tobago)
include this provision. However, Canada has agreed to this extension of the concept of
permanent establishment in six of the 21 tax treaties it negotiated with low-income
countries since 1988 (Armenia, India, Nigeria, Senegal, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe).
Fifth, the UN model convention considers independent agents to be a PE where their
activities are wholly or almost wholly devoted to the enterprise and the conditions for
their relationship are different from those that would have been made between
independent enterprises. This provision is not present in the OECD model convention.
Since 1988, Canada has included this provision in two of its tax treaties with high-income
countries (Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates), in eight of its tax treaties with middleincome countries, and in six of its tax treaties with low-income countries (Azerbaijan,
India, Jordan, Peru, Tanzania, Vietnam).
Sixth, the UN model expands the definition of permanent establishment to include
insurance activities that would not constitute a permanent establishment under the OECD
model convention. Under the OECD model treaty, insurance premiums are only taxable
in the source country if the insurance enterprise has an agent authorized to conclude
contracts on its behalf. Expanding the definition of permanent establishment, the UN
model convention provides that if an insurance company collects premiums in a country
or insures risks in the country through an employee or dependent agent in the country,
then the insurance company has a permanent establishment in that jurisdiction, and the
permanent establishment may be subject to tax. Canada has included this provision in
one tax treaty with a high-income country (Belgium), four with middle-income countries
(Argentina, Chile, Mexico (signed 1991)), and Mexico (signed 2006), and in seven
treaties with low-income countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Peru, Senegal,
Tanzania, and Vietnam).
This brief review of the expansion of the concept of permanent establishment in Canada’s
tax treaties with middle- and low-income countries reveals that Canada has continued to
13
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be willing to enlarge source jurisdiction for many of those countries, but certainly not all.
No larger trend was apparent over the 20 year period since Easson wrote his article on
Canada’s tax treaty policy, nor is any other generalization possible about when Canada
will adopt some of the UN model’s modification to the permanent establishment concept
and when it will not.
Expanding the Profit Allocated to Entities with a Permanent Establishment
In addition to defining the concept of permanent establishment, the OECD model
convention provides the basis on which the activities associated with a permanent
establishment will be subject to tax. Generally speaking, the OECD model suggests that
an enterprise should only be taxable in the source jurisdiction on the profits it earns that
relate to its permanent establishment and those profits should be calculated in the same
way they would be for domestic business activities – income tax should be applied to the
permanent establishment’s net profits. In terms of calculating the profits to be subject to
tax, the UN model makes two significant suggested changes.
First, the UN model suggests a modification that more closely aligns the calculation of
the permanent establishment’s taxable income with the ‘force of attraction’ principle – in
other words, once an enterprise has a permanent establishment in a jurisdiction, all
income derived by the enterprise in the jurisdiction should be subject to tax there. Under
the UN model convention, in addition to profits of the permanent establishment that are
calculated in the same way as under the OECD model treaty, the profits of the permanent
establishment will include profits that are attributable to (1) sales of goods or
merchandise of the same or similar kind as those sold through the permanent
establishment and (2) other business activities carried on of the same or similar kind as
those carried on through that permanent establishment. Two of Canada’s tax treaties with
middle-income countries (Argentina and Mexico (1991)) and six of Canada’s tax treaties
with low-income countries (India, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Tanzania, and
Zimbabwe) have included this expansion to the taxing jurisdiction of the source country.
In recent years, Canada seems to have become less likely to grant this expansion, having
agreed to the provision in only two treaties since 1996 (Armenia and Oman).
Second, both the OECD and the UN model allow generally for the deduction from
business profits of head office expenses incurred for the purpose of the business of the
permanent establishment including executive and general administrative expenses, even
if they are incurred in the non-source state; however, the UN model denies a deduction
for head office expenses where those expenses are payments for royalties, fees, interest,
and commissions for specific management services. Therefore, the UN model provides
for a significant expansion of the taxation of business profits earned at source. Canada
has been quite willing to grant this kind of expansion to low-income countries, having
done so in over 50 percent of the tax treaties with low-income countries it has negotiated
since 1988 (Armenia, Algeria, India, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Nigeria, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan, Venezuela, and Vietnam). It has been less likely to grant the extension to
middle-income countries (only three middle-income country treaties include the
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extension – Chile, Mexico (1991), and Mexico (2006)). It has also granted the extension
to a high-income country, Kuwait.
Allowing for the Taxation of Technical Fees.
If business income escapes taxation as business profits because the taxpayer lacks a
permanent establishment, generally speaking, the income is exempt from taxation at
source. However, in some cases, Canada has negotiated a technical or management fees
article that allows the source country to impose a withholding tax on technical or
management fees even in the absence of a permanent establishment. 14 The definition of
what constitutes a technical or management fee varies among the three tax treaties
negotiated since 1988 that include such an article, but generally each permits a
withholding tax be charged by the source country were there is a payment of any kind to
any person in consideration for any service of an administrative, technical, managerial or
consultancy nature. The Zimbabwe (1994) and Trinidad and Tobago treaties (1995) set a
maximum rate of 10 percent. The Tanzania treaty (1997) raises that rate to 20 percent.
Allowing for Taxation on the Alienation of Real Property
As noted above, since the time that Easson published his article, Canada has registered a
reservation on the OECD model treaty article that addresses the taxation of income from
real property. The OECD model tax treaty provides broad protections for source-based
taxation of income (but not alienation) from real property, presumably on the basis that
such property has a strong economic connection to the source state. Therefore, the source
state does not need to demonstrate that the taxpayer has a permanent establishment in
order to tax income from immovable property, including income from agriculture or
forestry. The article addressing the taxation of real property also provides that that article
applies to income derived from the direct use, letting, or use in any other form of
immovable property. Canada has reserved on the OECD model convention to preserve
its right to tax not only the income derived from real property but also the gains on the
alienation of that property under the real property article. Indeed, in all but eight of the
53 tax treaties negotiated between 1988 and 2008 the ability to tax non-residents on the
disposition of real property is preserved. In other words, Canada feels strongly enough
about the ability to tax income from the alienation of real property in Canada that it has
been willing to include expanded source taxation on this basis in its treaties regardless of
the income status of its negotiating partner.
Permitting Higher Withholding Tax Rates for Passive Income
Non-business forms of investment income, namely, interest, royalties, and dividends, are
each addressed in separate articles of the OECD and UN model tax treaties and in
Canada’s tax treaties. However, in most cases, their treatment is the same: jurisdiction to
tax the income is shared between the source and residence states. The source state is
14
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permitted to tax the income using a withholding tax applied to the gross payment, limited
to a particular rate. The residence state is permitted to tax the residual. When Easson
authored his article in 1988, he observed that Canada adhered to a 15-15-15 model (15
percent withholding tax on each of interest, royalties, and portfolio dividends). He noted
that for low-income countries, Canada was often willing to permit a higher rate of
withholding tax. Easson’s observation that Canada is willing to permit a higher rate of
withholding tax where the country is a low-income country remains true; however, there
appears to be a significant trend toward lower withholding tax rates generally.
Interest Income
The OECD proposes a withholding tax on interest of 10 percent. The UN model
convention does not set a particular rate, but it is assumed that a higher rate might be
appropriate where the treaty partner is a lower-income country. Canada has negotiated
withholding tax rates of 10, 12.5, or 15 percent, depending on the treaty partner. The rate
was set at 10 percent for all high-income countries with which Canada has negotiated
treaties since 1988. For the 21 low-income countries, in 12 treaties the rate is 10 percent,
in one treaty it is 12.5 percent, in seven treaties it is 15 percent, and in one treaty the rate
is non-reciprocal: Senegal can impose a withholding tax of 20 percent on “bons de
caisse” interest and 16 percent on other interest, and Canada can set a rate of 15 percent.
In addition to low withholding rates, exemptions from the taxation of certain types of
interest income will also erode the tax revenues of source countries. Canada offers
relatively few exemptions from withholding tax on interest in its tax treaties. All of the
treaties negotiated since 1988, except those with Chile, Croatia, and Peru, include an
exemption for government-related interest payments. Treaties with high-income
countries also frequently include exemptions for pension related entities, exemptions for
credit sales of equipment and merchandise, and exemptions for late payment penalties.
These exemptions are less common in the tax treaties negotiated with low-income
countries. Aside from government-related interest payments, in Canada’s tax treaties
with low-income countries only four include an exemption for interest income, and in
each case it is for pension-related entities (Moldova, Tanzania, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe).
This low number of exemptions might be compared to the 11 tax treaties with middleincome countries that include an exemption for some type of interest payment (other than
the government-related interest payments).
Over time, Canada’s rates of withholding on interest have been declining. The third
protocol to the Canada-US tax treaty, signed in 1995, marked the reduction of
withholding tax rates on interest to 10 percent from the 15 percent that was common
when Easson authored his article. In the 2007 federal budget, Canada announced its
intention to remove altogether its domestic withholding tax on interest payments to
unrelated foreign lenders. This is a significant change to Canada’s withholding tax
policy. It was contingent on the entry-into-force of Canada’s newly revised tax treaty
with the United States, and is now in force. 15 The new Canada-United States treaty
includes the additional benefit that non-arm’s length lenders will also be exempt, with the
15
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only exception to the exemption being participating debt interest, which is subject to the
same withholding tax rate as portfolio dividends.
Royalties
The OECD model treaty proposes a zero rate of withholding on royalty payments.
Canada has always deviated from this position. Since 1988, Canada has negotiated tax
treaties with rates of 10, 12.5, 15, and 20 percent rates. For all high-income countries the
rate is 10 percent. For low-income countries, Canada has negotiated a rate of 10 percent
in 14 tax treaties, of 12.5 percent in one tax treaty, of 15 percent in 5 tax treaties and of
20 percent in one tax treaty (with Tanzania in 1995). It appears that Canada has become
increasingly likely to negotiate a rate of 10 percent with all countries (regardless of their
income status), given that it has not granted a rate other than 10 percent since the Senegal
treaty was signed in 2001.
The royalties articles also often contain exemptions from withholding tax. Canada
frequently negotiates exemptions (or lower rates of withholding tax) for royalties related
to cultural goods (for example, literary works), patents, information concerning
industrial, commercial, or scientific experience, and computer software. Many of these
exemptions are presumably requested because Canada grants an exemption from
withholding tax in its domestic tax law for these kinds of payments. Canada is much
more likely to include exemptions from royalty withholding in its tax treaties when the
treaty partner is a high-income country. For example, only three tax treaties with highincome countries contain no exemptions, compared to nine treaties with middle-income
countries and 17 treaties with low-income countries. Although 17 treaties with lowincome countries do not include exemptions from withholding tax payments on royalties,
eight (Azerbaijan, Equador, Mongolia, Trinidad, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, 16
Zimbabwe) include reductions from the standard withholding tax rate provided for in the
treaty for some kinds of royalty payments, thereby reducing the tax revenues collected by
the source country from income from those kinds of royalty payments.
Dividends
Both the OECD and UN model treaties provide for split rates of withholding tax for
dividend payments. If the taxpayer has a significant investment in the corporation paying
the dividend the withholding rate is typically lower than if the taxpayer is only holding a
so-called portfolio investment. It is therefore necessary to distinguish between a
significant investment, to which the lower rate will apply, and a portfolio investment. In
making this distinction the OECD model treaty has a much higher ownership threshold
(25 percent) than the UN model (10 percent). Canada’s tax treaties set the threshold for
portfolio dividend treatment at different levels, but usually the rate is set at either 10
percent (in 10 tax treaties with high-income countries, eight with middle-income
countries, and 10 with low-income countries) or 25 percent (in two tax treaties with highincome countries, eight with middle-income countries, and four with low-income
16
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countries). In one case, Vietnam, there are three possible rates (5 percent when the
taxpayer has more than 70 percent of the voting shares, 10 percent when the owner has
between 25 and 70 percent, and 15 percent when the owner has less than 25 percent of
the voting shares). In three cases, all low-income countries (Algeria, Kyrgystan, and
Senegal), there is no differential rate (ie. the withholding tax rate is the same regardless
of the share ownership).
In terms of the withholding tax rates for significant investments, Canada is more likely to
negotiate higher withholding tax rates with low-income countries. Canada has negotiated
withholding tax rates for significant investment of 5 percent (with 14 high-income
countries, 9 middle-income countries, and eight low-income countries), 10 percent (with
one high-income country, eight middle-income countries, and six low-income countries),
12.5 percent (with one low-income country), 15 percent (with four low-income countries)
and 20 percent (with one low-income country, Tanzania).
In terms of the withholding tax rates for portfolio investments, Canada traditionally
negotiated a withholding tax rate of 15 percent, except in four low-income country cases,
where the portfolio withholding rates were set at 16 percent (Senegal), 20 percent
(Zimbabwe), and 25 percent (India and Tanzania). Senegal is the latest of these treaties
to have been signed (in 2001). The other three were signed in the early/mid-1990s. This
perhaps suggests that Canada’s treaty negotiators have moved to a firmer position on a 15
percent maximum withholding tax rate for dividends.
As was the case for interest payments, in a few instances, Canada has agreed to nonreciprocal withholding tax rates: in the Zimbabwe treaty the rate is 15 percent for
payments from Canada and 20 percent for payments from Zimbabwe and in the Senegal
treaty the rate is 15 percent for payments from Canada and 16 percent for payments from
Senegal.
Generally no exemptions are provided from dividend withholding tax; although Canada
has negotiated four tax treaties that contain an exemption – in the case of Denmark,
Luxembourg, and Oman for shares owned by pension-related entities and in the case of
Norway for shares held by governments.
In an effort to ensure equality of treatment between branch operations and separately
incorporated entities, Canada imposes a branch tax of 25 percent on unincorporated
branches carrying on business in Canada. 17 Since the OECD model treaty expressly
prohibits taxes on undistributed profits of a non-resident company, Canada has registered
a reservation to the taxation of dividends article to preserve its ability to impose the
branch profits tax. Canada’s tax treaties reduce the rate of the branch profits tax to the
lowest dividend rate, which means that to the extent that the withholding tax rate on
dividends has been declining for low-income countries, the withholding tax rate on
branch taxes has been reduced as well. This is not likely significant for low-income
countries, since few of them presumably collect a branch profits tax.
17
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Preserving the Tax Incentives of Low-Income Countries
Easson was an international expert on the design of tax incentives and his 1988 essay on
Canada’s tax treaty policy reviews Canada’s use of tax sparing to preserve the
effectiveness of tax incentives offered by low-income countries. Tax sparing provisions
preserve the tax incentives granted by a low-income country by requiring the highincome country to give a tax credit for the taxes that would have been paid had the
incentive not been granted. In the absence of such a treaty provision, if a low-income
country forgoes taxes on certain income earned in its jurisdiction in an effort to attract
foreign investment, the high-income country, if it taxes income earned by its residents on
a world-wide basis, would simply tax its resident on the full amount of that income
without having to provide any offsetting tax credit, thereby removing altogether the effect
of the tax incentive offered by the low-income country.
Easson observed that up until 1988 tax sparing provisions were routinely granted to lowincome countries. Since 1988, Canada has agreed to a tax sparing provision in 11 of its
tax treaties (four in its tax treaties with middle-income countries and seven in tax treaties
with low-income countries (Algeria, Bulgaria, India, Mongolia, Nigeria, Tanzania,
Vietnam)). The most recent tax sparing provision was granted in 2002 in Canada’s tax
treaty with Mongolia. Over this period, however, Canada has become less likely to grant
tax sparing provisions. In 1998 the OECD released a report that urged countries to
reconsider the use of tax sparing provisions in their tax treaties, but did not outright argue
that tax sparing provisions should be abandoned. 18 On the basis of this report, in 2000,
the OECD modified their commentary on tax sparing.19 The revised commentary
emphasizes that tax sparing is “very vulnerable to taxpayer abuse”, 20 cautions that tax
sparing may not be an effective means of promoting development, and underlines that tax
sparing provisions may facilitate the erosion of the tax bases of other countries. The
commentary also suggests that tax sparing only be used by countries where the economic
level of the country to which the sparing is granted is significantly below that of the
OECD country. Since the release of the 2000 commentary, Canada has agreed to a tax
sparing provision in only the treaty with Mongolia, and the scope of that provision
preserved a discrete tax incentive for a limited period of time. Canada appears to have
ceased granting tax sparing provisions.
It might be noted, however, that the popularity of tax sparing provisions in Canada’s tax
treaties prior to the release of the OECD’s 2000 commentary is somewhat curious. 21 As
discussed above, Canada provides an exemption for dividends received from foreign
affiliates if the dividend is paid from active business income earned in a country with
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which Canada has a tax treaty. Consequently, so long as a Canadian multinational carries
on its foreign business activity through a foreign affiliate and so long as the country in
which the business income is earned has a treaty with Canada no Canadian tax would be
payable and thus the effect of a tax incentive offered by low-income country would be
preserved even without a tax sparing provision. In addition, as part of the 2007 budget
proposals, the Canadian government announced changes that extend the exemption
treatment of active business income earned in a non-treaty country if that country has a
tax information exchange agreement with Canada. This change might affect the
negotiation of additional comprehensive tax treaties. If an information exchange
agreement is sufficient to obtain the exemption from Canadian tax, businesses or lowincome countries might not press the Canadian government to negotiate comprehensive
treaties. Instead, if a low-income country offers a business tax incentive that Canadian
multinationals can benefit from, so long as the business is carried in that country through
a foreign affiliate of the Canadian firm, the incentive will be preserved if the country has
a tax information exchange agreement with Canada.
Future Directions in Canada’s Tax Treaty Policy with Low-Income Countries
Easson concludes his 1988 article by forecasting issues that would be likely to influence
future tax treaty negotiations. He predicts:
•
•
•
•
•
•

countries are likely to continue to expand their tax treaty networks, including in
Latin America and the Middle East;
the number of multilateral treaties between clusters of countries might be
expected to grow;
concerns about tax treaty abuse might be expected to grow;
countries might be expected to increase efforts to combat avoidance and evasion;
interest in unitary taxation might be expected to grow; and
domestic tax reforms will continue to influence the design of tax treaties.

In some respects Easson’s predictions have proven correct. Canada has certainly
continued to expand its tax treaty network. Also, along with other OECD countries, it
has become increasingly concerned about the use of tax treaties as a mechanism for
avoidance, conscious of the importance of tax treaties as a means of facilitating
information exchanges, and cognizant of the need for more effective means of dispute
resolution. In other respects, however, Easson appears to have been too optimistic,
Although many scholars have been enthusiastic about the promise of unitary taxation, it
does not appear to be any closer to realization than it was in 1988. Furthermore, the
number of multilateral treaties has not grown significantly over the last twenty years.
This chapter does not conclude as boldly as Easson’s article, by making predictions.
Instead, it concludes by noting that the signing of Canada’s most recent protocol with the
United States and suggesting that that protocol might signal a change in Canada’s tax
treaty policy with significant implications for low-income countries.
Canada signed its fifth protocol to the 1980 Canada-United States tax convention in 2007.
That protocol marks a significant change in Canada’s tax treaty policy with the United
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States, and by implication, to Canada’s tax treaty policy generally. In particular, four
changes, and their potential implications for low-income country treaty negotiations,
might be highlighted. First, as noted above, Canada’s treaty with the United States
extends Canada’s newly enacted domestic withholding tax exemption on interest to nonarm’s length interest payments. This domestic change and its treaty extension might be
expected to put downward pressure on withholding tax rates making it increasingly
difficult for low-income countries to raise tax revenues from non-business foreign
investment. Differential rates between interest, royalties, and dividend payments might
also be expected to put pressure on the characterization of repatriations from low-income
countries, although in many cases the rates imposed on these sources of income are
already different.
Second, some jurisdictions include provisions in their tax treaties that are designed to
prevent residents of third countries, who are not bona fide residents of one of the two
treaty countries, from indirectly taking advantage of the benefits provided under the
treaty. Unlike the United States, which usually negotiates a limitation of benefits
provision in its tax treaties, Canada has historically taken the position that our general
anti-avoidance rule should be sufficient to combat tax treaty shopping. 22 However,
Canada appears to be changing this view. In addition to the general anti-avoidance rule
in its domestic legislation, in the last several years, Canada has also included more
limited provisions in the “miscellaneous” articles of its treaties that attempt to restrict the
use of tax treaties where there are preferential tax regimes for non-residents. 23 More
dramatically, the fifth protocol to the Canada-US tax treaty brought into effect Canada’s
first mutual limitation of benefits provision. 24 If limitation on benefits provisions
become a norm in Canada’s tax treaty negotiations, low-income countries might
anticipate additional pressure on their tax administrations to police, for example, access
to tax incentives that are preserved by treaty provisions or treaty design.
Third, the protocol changes the treatment of services provided by individuals to deem
those services to constitute a permanent establishment. If an individual performing
services is not a permanent establishment under the standard definition, the deeming rule
deems the individual to have a permanent establishment if he or she performs services in
the state for a period of 183 days or more in any 12-month period and during that period
22
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more than 50 percent of the gross active business revenues of the enterprise consist of
income derived from services performed in the state by the individual. The deeming rule
also applies if the services are provided for the same period of time with respect to the
same or connected project for customers who are either residents of the source state or
who maintain a permanent establishment in the source state and the services are provided
in respect of that permanent establishment. Low-income countries might watch this
development with interest given the importance of taxing business income, and the
difficulties establishing that an enterprise has a permanent establishment in the
jurisdiction. This provision is like the tax treaties with middle- or low-income countries
that include a provision enabling the taxation of an enterprise which has a dependent
agent furnishing services. In many cases the time period required for taxation under
those provisions in Canada’s tax treaties with low-income countries exceeds 183 days.
Presumably the U.S. protocol suggests that Canada may be willing to consider agreeing
to services provisions more frequently, and with lower time thresholds.
Finally, the new protocol requires that disputes between competent authorities be
resolved by compulsory arbitration. Tax treaties generally include an article that
addresses the resolution of disputes, or a mutual agreement procedure. Although initially
resisted by the OECD, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, pushed by the business
community, 25 the popularity of arbitration as a means of resolving disputes between
competent authorities and/or between competent authorities and taxpayers grew. In
1992, the OECD added commentary to the exchange of information provision of its
model treaty that recognized arbitration as an option for dispute resolution and in 2007
the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs adopted proposed changes that incorporated a
mandatory and binding arbitration procedure. 26 It is perhaps not surprising that inclusion
of an arbitration provision as a means of resolving disputes between countries about the
application of the tax treaty has grown since Easson authored his article. Indeed, Canada
has included arbitration provisions in 12 of its treaties with high-income countries, 14
treaties with middle-income countries, and 17 treaties with low-income countries.
The Canada-U.S. protocol is not the only signal of a change in Canada’s tax treaty policy.
In its 2007 budget, the government announced that it was striking an advisory panel to
review Canada’s system of international taxation. That committee has released a
consultation report that indicates it is considering some potential major changes in
direction in Canada’s domestic legislation, which would have consequences for Canada’s
tax treaty policy. 27 For example, the advisory panel has identified inbound treaty
shopping, expanding the exemption system for active business income, and broadening
the withholding tax exemptions as issues for consideration.
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Easson’s article focuses on the Carter Commission report as a marker for change in
Canada’s tax treaty policy. It seems that with the new Canada-U.S. tax treaty protocol
and with the striking of an international tax advisory panel, Canada is likely to be
embarking on another period of tax treaty policy change. Hopefully, the special
circumstances of low-income countries will not be ignored when these changes are made
and thus cynics and others will not be able to claim that the real purpose of the changed
policies was simply to shift investment and revenue from low-income countries to
Canada. 28
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One anonymous reviewer of this chapter helpfully suggests that the Department of Finance might be
urged to lend an elite team of treaty negotiators to work with low-income countries to ensure that those
countries receive the negotiating advice and expertise that they (in many cases) badly need.

